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Footnotes
1. The Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court collected data on the impact
of its approach to the Florida foreclosure crisis to satisfy require-
ments imposed by state and local legislators as a condition of
receiving additional funding. The other three reforms were rigor-
ously evaluated by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC).
2. The Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts were adopted by
the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court
Administrators, the National Association for Court Management,
and the ABA House of Delegates in August 2011. RICHARD VAN
DUIZEND et al., MODEL TIME STANDARDS FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS
(2011).
3. Clearance rates reflect the number of outgoing (closed) cases as a
percentage of income (newly filed) cases. See CourTools Measure
2 (2005).
4. The study reported estimated costs at the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles (the interquartile range) for cases disposed at different
stages of litigation. For each of the case types studied, litigation
costs doubled from the 25th to the 50th percentile, and then dou-
bled again from the 50th to the 75th percentile, resulting in a sur-
prisingly broad range of costs at every stage of litigation. Paula
Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings
from a Survey of Trial Lawyers, VOIR DIRE 22 (Spring 2013).
For more than a century, excessive costs and delays havebeen a chronic complaint about the American civil justicesystem. Although some states took steps to improve civil
case processing in the past, most of those efforts had only a
negligible effect, if any, and few were able to sustain those
effects over time. Recently, however, a number of states have
implemented civil justice reforms that couple changes in pro-
cedural rules with improved civil case automation and staffing
models that offer new hope for significant improvements in
civil case processing. This paper focuses on four reforms
implemented in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida
(Miami-Dade); in Strafford and Carroll counties, New Hamp-
shire; and statewide in Utah and Texas.1
The working assumption for all four reforms was that
streamlining the litigation process,
providing more effective oversight,
and reducing opportunities for
satellite litigation would save liti-
gants both time and money without
compromising fairness. Assessing
the impact of the reform on time is
a fairly straightforward task.  Time-
to-disposition is a standard mea-
sure that courts have used for
decades to assess performance.
Many states have adopted explicit
time standards for civil cases based
on either the Model Time Standards
for State Trial Courts2 or state-spe-
cific time standards. Most states also monitor clearance rates to
identify backlogs before they become excessive.3
Monetary savings, in contrast, have historically been diffi-
cult to estimate due to lawyers’ reluctance to disclose the
details of client financial transactions. In 2013, the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) surveyed experienced attor-
neys about the amount of time expended to complete litigation
tasks and used those responses to generate estimates of legal
and expert witness fees for a variety of civil case cases (Figure
1).4 Trials were the single most expensive stage of litigation,
followed by discovery, pretrial preparation, case initiation, and
settlement negotiations. Theoretically, therefore, civil justice
reforms that streamline discovery and that promote non-trial
case resolution could reasonably be expected to reduce litiga-
tion costs. Cases that were disposed by summary judgment or
trial would also benefit from a streamlined process that
reduced discovery and pretrial costs. This article describes
findings from the evaluations of those reforms and, where pos-
sible, combines estimates of costs expended in civil litigation
with data from these evaluations to offer preliminary estimates
of the cost savings to litigants.
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA
The 2008-2009 economic recession precipitated a spike in
mortgage foreclosure actions across the country. In Florida,
mortgage foreclosure cases increased by 233 percent between
2006 and 2009 statewide, and by 276 percent in the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit Court (Miami-Dade). Traditional case manage-
ment had been performed by judges, who examined the needs of
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Figure 1: Median Costs of Litigation by Case Type
5. The NCSC evaluation compared key case-processing events and
outcomes for civil cases filed before and after implementation of
the PAD Rules. Debt collection and tort cases comprised nearly
two-thirds of the civil caseloads in those samples (34% and 29%,
respectively). NCSC staff also interviewed key stakeholders
involved in the development and implementation of the PAD Pilot
Rules, as well as attorneys who had litigated cases under the PAD
Pilot Rules, but who were not involved in their development.
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NEW HAMPSHIRE: IMPACT OF THE
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY/AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE (PAD) PILOT
RULES (August 19, 2013).
cases one by one as each case was presented by attorneys. The
foreclosure crisis turned that model upside down, as attorneys
had more cases than they could manage and quality control was
erratic. To address the crisis, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court
obtained funding to develop a case management system featur-
ing four distinct tiers of processing and oversight: technology,
clerical staff, skilled (professional) staff, and judicial staff. 
The design of this staffing model was based on two key
premises. First, judicial involvement in case management pro-
duces momentum toward resolution only if the case is in a
position to move to the next stage in litigation at the time the
judge is asked to intervene. Second, a judge is the most expert,
highly trained, and expensive human resource in the court sys-
tem. Thus, the intent of the staffing model was to ensure that
judges would not perform routine case reviews that could be
performed by less expensive court staff. Each staffing tier was
assigned tasks that matched the training level of the individu-
als employed in that capacity. The staffing model was imple-
mented in two divisions of the Circuit Court to address the
backlog of foreclosure cases in 2011. 
The court collected data for evaluation purposes on the
clearance rates for all divisions managing mortgage foreclosure
cases. The clearance rate for the two divisions using the
staffing model was nearly double (281%) compared to the divi-
sion that did not employ the staffing model (145%). Moreover,
newly filed cases were disposed considerably faster under the
staffing model. Nearly two-thirds of cases (62%) were disposed
within 12 months compared to 45 percent of cases in the divi-
sion that did not employ the staffing model. Eighty percent
(80%) of newly filed cases were disposed within 18 months
compared to only half (52%) of cases in the division that did
not employ the staffing model.
The NCSC has not developed time and cost estimates for
mortgage foreclosure cases, so it is not possible to estimate the
financial impact of the staffing model on litigant costs. But it is
reasonable to assume that the reduced disposition time trans-
lates to a reduction in litigant costs overall, particularly when
the reduced disposition time is due to increased court over-
sight of litigant filings to prevent court hearings from taking
place on cases in which the litigants are unprepared to pro-
ceed. While court hearings are necessarily expensive events,
those costs are considerably more justifiable when they move
the case toward resolution than when they merely result in a
continuance to allow the parties more time to prepare.
NEW HAMPSHIRE PAD PILOT RULES 
The New Hampshire reforms involved implementation of
the Proportional Discovery/Automatic Disclosure (PAD) Rules
on a pilot basis in two counties effective October 1, 2010. The
rules were expected to change litigation practice in a number
of ways, but the most significant changes involved changing
the pleading requirement from a notice pleading to a fact-
pleading standard and the introduction of a mandatory disclo-
sure requirement. The change in the fact-pleading standard
was expected to reduce the time to disposition, mostly by
reducing the amount of time expended on case initiation and
discovery. The introduction of the mandatory disclosure
requirement was expected to reduce the amount of time
needed to complete discovery, which in turn would reduce
overall time to disposition, as well as reduce the incidence of
satellite litigation involving discovery disputes.5
Ironically, neither of the expected effects of the PAD Rules
ultimately occurred. Anecdotal reports suggested that the cases
were getting underway somewhat faster due to the new rules,
but were not actually resolving at a faster rate. A possible rea-
son was that the PAD Rules replaced a requirement for an in-
court case-scheduling conference with a requirement that
attorneys submit a joint case-scheduling order, but did not
expressly impose expectations for timeliness. Consequently,
attorneys adopted the same time frames for completing litiga-
tion tasks that they had before the rules went into effect. 
The PAD Rules likewise did not affect the rate of discovery
disputes, which arose in approximately one-tenth of civil cases
in both the pre-implementation and post-implementation peri-
ods. These rates do not, on their face, suggest an overly liti-
gious legal culture in which lawyers routinely complain of
excessive discovery demands. This does not discount the pos-
sibility that discovery disputes occur, but if they are generally
resolved without court involvement, they would be difficult to
control through procedural rules. 
An unexpected impact of the PAD Rules was a decrease in
the rate of default judgments from 19 percent to 12 percent
overall, which was attributed to the increased amount of infor-
mation disclosed about the plaintiff’s claims under a fact-
pleading standard. This effect was observed across all case cat-
egories (Figure 2). Yet the reduction in default rates did not
uniformly translate to increased rates of other dispositions.
Tort cases, for example, were more likely to be dismissed or
withdrawn under the PAD rules, but there was no increase in
judgment rates and a slight decrease in settlement rates. Con-
tract cases experienced a significant increase in formal judg-
ment rates that corresponded almost exactly with the decrease
in default rates. Real property cases experienced a significant
increase in both settlement and formal judgments rates under
the PAD rules, but no difference was observed in the dismissal
rate. For agency appeals, the decrease in the default rate was
relatively modest, but the dismissal rate decreased by almost
half (37 percent to 19 percent) and the judgment rate nearly
doubled (12 percent to 23 percent).
Looking at these effects through the lens of litigation costs
might reasonably prompt the conclusion that litigant costs had
increased in many cases. By making an appearance, defendants
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6. Automobile tort and premises liability cases comprised 45 percent
of tort cases, and debt collection cases comprised 72 percent of
contract cases in the New Hampshire caseload.
7. For the evaluation, the NCSC analyzed case-level data for all cases
filed January 1 to June 30, 2011 (pre-implementation sample) and
January 1 to June 30, 2012 (post-implementation sample). The
NCSC also surveyed attorneys who filed cases in the post-imple-
mentation sample and conducted focus groups with Utah district
court judges. The attorney surveys collected information about
discovery practices that would not ordinarily be documented in
the case management system, attorney opinions about the Rule 26
revisions, and estimates of the amount of time expended on vari-
ous litigation tasks for different types of cases.
8. Discovery does not occur in uncontested cases. Consequently, the
NCSC evaluation focused only on cases in which an answer or
other responsive pleading was filed.
would naturally incur the costs of filing an answer and other-
wise engaging in discovery, pretrial motions, and possibly trial
proceedings. Except for cases in which the plaintiff filed a
motion to dismiss or to withdraw the case, plaintiffs likewise
would have to take additional steps beyond filing a motion for
a default judgment. Based on NCSC’s “Civil Litigation Cost
Model Project” (CLCM) litigation cost estimates, the addi-
tional median costs incurred by the plaintiff in settling cases
that would have resulted in a default judgment before the PAD
Rules could range up to $800 in a debt collection case, $12,000
in an automobile tort case, $14,400 in a premises liability case,
and nearly $20,000 in a real property case.6 Yet, by providing
sufficient information on which the defendant can assess the
legitimacy of the plaintiff’s claims, the PAD rules evidently
made it worthwhile for defendants to respond to the lawsuit
rather than accepting a default judgment. Like the mortgage
foreclosure staffing model implemented by the Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit Court in Florida, the New Hampshire PAD rules
introduced a procedural reform that increased the likelihood
that meaningful litigation would take place, ostensibly improv-
ing the likelihood of a just outcome.
UTAH RULE 26 EVALUATION  
The Utah civil justice reforms focused exclusively on the dis-
covery stage of litigation. Amendments to Rule 26 and other
rules governing discovery were implemented on a statewide
basis on November 1, 2011. The rules introduced an explicit
proportionality requirement in discovery, shifted the burden of
demonstrating the relevance and proportionality of discovery
requests to the party requesting discovery, and established three
distinct “discovery tiers” with a presumptive scope of discovery
based on amount-in-controversy for each tier. The amended
rules also introduced a mandatory disclosure requirement and
an expedited process for resolving discovery disputes.7 The
anticipated impact of the Rule 26 revisions included
decreased time to complete discovery and a corre-
sponding decrease in time to disposition in contested
cases,8 a decrease in the frequency of discovery dis-
putes, and a reduction in associated litigation costs.  
The revisions to Rule 26 significantly decreased the
time to disposition for all case types and at all discov-
ery tiers in the post-implementation sample of cases.
The most immediate impact occurred in debt collec-
tion cases involving amounts-in-controversy less than
$50,000 (Tier 1), which disposed at significantly
faster rates beginning within 90 days after filing. Non-
debt collection cases and civil cases alleging damages
greater than $50,000 also disposed at faster rates, but
only beginning 12 months after filing.     
Another impact of the discovery reforms was the manner in
which civil cases disposed. Across all case types and discovery
tiers, civil cases were more likely to settle, rather than be dis-
posed by judgment, following implementation of the reforms.
The single largest effect occurred in non-debt collection cases
alleging damages less than $50,000, for which settlement rates
increased by more than two-thirds. Civil cases alleging dam-
ages more than $50,000 also settled at significantly higher
rates (Figure 3).  
Cases that settle avoid the costs associated with proceeding
to a disposition by summary judgment or trial. Based on the
NCSC costs estimates, for example, parties in a non-debt col-
lection contract case that settled rather than seeking a trial
judgment would save as much as $58,000 each in litigation
costs. If the parties could settle without formal settlement
negotiations or ADR, they could save up to an additional
$17,000 per side. These estimates assume that the settlement
occurs after discovery is complete; however, the NCSC evalu-
ation also found that more than half (54%) of the cases in the
Utah evaluation resolved before discovery was complete. In
fact, one-third of civil cases had no discovery other than
mandatory disclosures. Moreover, fewer discovery disputes
were filed following the Rule 26 revisions. Although it is not
possible to quantify those savings in precise terms, reducing
the amount of discovery and associated opportunities for dis-
putes over discovery suggests the potential for additional sav-
ings of up to $12,000.
TEXAS EXPEDITED ACTIONS RULES
The Texas Expedited Actions Rules, which became effective
on March 1, 2013, impose restrictions on civil cases valued
$100,000 or less. The rules specify an expedited timeline for
discovery and trial in which discovery commences immedi-
ately upon filing and must be concluded within 180 days of
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Figure 2: Default judgment rate before and after
implementation of NH PAD Pilot Rules
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9. The analysis focused on cases that either settled or were resolved
by summary judgment, or bench or jury trial, or were pending at
the time data collection concluded. The pre-implementation sam-
ple consisted of cases filed between July 1 and December 31,
2011, and the post-implementation sample consisted of cases
filed between July 1 and December 31, 2013. The NCSC also sur-
veyed attorneys who filed cases under the revised rules, focusing
on attorney opinions about the new rules and documenting case
information that is not ordinarily reflected in the case manage-
ment system. To supplement the case-level and attorney survey
data, research staff from the Texas Administrative Office of the
Courts and students from Baylor University Law School con-
ducted in-depth interviews with judges, case coordinators, and
attorneys who had experience with the rules. Like the Utah Rule
26 revisions, implementation of the Texas Expedited Actions
Rules resulted in a significant shift from cases resolved by judg-
ment to cases resolved by settlement and a significant decrease in
the time to disposition. Attorneys reported high compliance with
the rules, even with greatly restricted scope of discovery.
10. Cases disposed by summary judgment or trial appeared to take
longer to dispose. Upon closer examination, however, it became
apparent that the increased settlement rate was taking place in rel-
atively uncomplicated contract cases that previously would have
been disposed by bench trial early in the case. Only the more
complex contract and tort cases remained for trial, and although
these cases needed comparatively more time for discovery and
pretrial motions, they were still being tried earlier than compara-
ble cases before the expedited actions rules were enacted.
11. CONFERENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES, CCJ Civil Justice Improvements
Committee, Call to Action: Achieving Civil Justice for All 16 (2016).
serving the first discovery request. The trial must be scheduled
no later than 90 days after the completion of discovery. The
rules also significantly restrict the scope of discovery to no
more than 6 hours of oral depositions for all witnesses, no
more than 15 written interrogatories, no more than 15 requests
for production, and no more than 15 requests for admissions.
Finally, the rules impose restrictions on court-ordered ADR.
The NCSC evaluated the impact of the rules on contested cases
filed in the courts at law in five urban counties.9
Like the Utah Rule 26 revisions, implementation of the Texas
Expedited Actions Rules resulted in significantly increased set-
tlement rates. Overall, the proportion of cases disposed by set-
tlement increased from 49 percent to 66 percent, with com-
mensurate decreases in summary judgment and trial rates. The
settlement rate for commercial contract cases increased by more
than half (54%), followed by debt collection cases (34%) and
automobile tort cases (5%). In addition to increased settlement
rates, settlements occurred on average (median) five months
earlier than settlements that occurred before implementation of
the expedited actions rules. More than one-third of the cases
resolved with no formal discovery over than mandatory disclo-
sures. Based on the NCSC estimates, the cost savings associated
with settling cases with little or no formal discovery, rather than
proceeding to summary judgment or trial, ranges from just over
$1,000 in debt collection cases to as much as $70,000 per side
in commercial contract disputes.
The increase in settlement rates was greatest in contract
cases, which comprised more than two-thirds of the civil case-
load in the NCSC evaluation. The settlement rate in non-auto-
mobile tort cases decreased, however, due to a significant
increase in trial rates.10 Moreover, nearly half of attorneys
reported that it would have been economically feasible to bring
the case to trial, even in cases that ultimately settled, which
accomplished an explicit objective of the rules to ensure that
parties who wanted a trial on the merits could afford to do so.
Thus, while the increase in trial rates for those cases would
result in up to $45,000 in increased costs per side, litigants
may view those costs as warranted to secure a fair outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
The four civil justice reforms discussed above have been the
focus of intense interest by judicial and legal policymakers.
Many of the concepts embodied in these reforms have been
incorporated in the Recommendations of the CCJ Civil Justice
Improvements Committee as necessary components of state
court efforts “to promote the just, prompt, and inexpensive
resolution of civil cases.”11 Three of these reforms focus on dis-
crete aspects of contemporary civil litigation (e.g., pleading,
discovery, caseflow management), while the Texas approach
was somewhat more comprehensive in scope. 
The precise nature of the impact of these reforms varied
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but all of them
ultimately had a positive effect on the manner of disposition,
time to disposition, or other key case performance measures.
For example, the Utah and Texas reforms both
resulted in substantial increases in settlement rates.
All the reforms except the New Hampshire PAD Rules
dramatically reduced disposition times. Increased set-
tlement rates and reduced time to disposition intu-
itively support predictions of greatly reduced litiga-
tion costs. Cases that settle relatively early in the liti-
gation process avoid the costs associated with expen-
sive court proceedings such as summary judgment
hearings and bench or jury trials. Of course, these
effects would not apply to all cases and likely differ by
jurisdiction and by case type. The impact of the New
Hampshire PAD Rules is unusual insofar that the pri-
mary impact was a significant reduction in the default
judgment rate. This results in a larger proportion of
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Figure 3: Settlement rate before and after
revisions to Rule 26
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12. See, e.g., John M. Greacen, How Fair, Fast, and Cheap Should
Courts Be? Instead of Letting Lawyers and Judges Decide, New Mex-
ico Asked Its Customers, 82 JUDICATURE 287 (MAY-JUNE 1999).
defendants filing an appearance to contest the plaintiff’s
claims, which would necessarily incur additional litigation
costs and time for both sides.
Perhaps the most important point about these reforms is
that they provide incentives to litigants to engage in more
meaningful litigation activities. Mandatory disclosures, for
example, displace much of the need for traditional discovery
practice as well as minimize opportunities for disputes to arise.
An accelerated time frame for completing key stages of litiga-
tion prompts litigants to focus on the issues that form the crux
of the dispute. And delegating routine case management to
court staff facilitates more targeted and meaningful judicial
involvement in the case, providing incentives for parties to
prepare adequately for routine court deadlines and events.
Consequently, when litigation activity takes place resulting in
some cost to litigants, those costs are presumably incurred
with the intent to bring the case to a fair outcome. 
There are, of course, several additional questions related to
the premise that litigation costs should only be incurred for
tasks that are truly necessary to resolve the case. The first is
whether the litigants themselves believe that the value of any
individual task associated with the litigation justifies its actual
costs. Although civil justice reforms may reduce litigation
costs, it does not necessarily follow that litigants will agree that
the value of those tasks outweighs the cost.12 A second ques-
tion is whether litigants have sufficient information about the
likely outcome of the litigation with which to make an
informed judgment about undertaking various litigation tasks.
A related question is whether litigants are given the opportu-
nity to give informed consent to the anticipated costs of litiga-
tion before they are actually incurred. None of these questions
are addressed in this article, but the types of civil justice
reforms discussed here render those questions more salient
insofar that litigants can have greater confidence that any costs
expended in litigation are more likely to ensure a meaningful
litigation experience than before.
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